Date: Thu, 03 Nov 1994 09:01:40 +0000 (GMT) From: mkusch@castle.edinburgh.ac.uk To: h-verkko@sara.cc.utu.fi Subject: Re: On relativism
> Kun puhutaan relativismista, olisi hyva sanoa, mita suhteellistetaan.
Actually not only WHAT is made relative, but also what is made relative TO WHAT needs to be considered.
> Kasittaakseni sana relativismi voi viitata a) siihen, etta eri
> tutkimusmetodit johtavat erilaisiin tutkimustuloksiin, kutsun tata
> metodiseksi relativismiksi;
This 'methodological relativism' is uncontroversial.
> b) siihen, etta kohteen ja sen tutkija valinen
> suhde on aina vaistamatta hamara, kutsun tata epistemologiseksi
> relativismiksi;
That's not how epistemological relativism is usually understood. It seems to me that a more interesting version is formulated by H. Siegel in his book _Relativism Refuted_:
'For any knowledge-claim p, p can be evaluated (assessed, established, etc.) only according to (with reference to) one or another set of background principles and standards of evaluation s1, ... sn; and, given a different set (or sets) of background principles and standards s'1, ... s'n, there is no neutral (that is, neutral with respect to the two (or more) alternative sets of principles and standards) way of choosing between the two (or more) alternative sets in evaluating p with respect to truth or rational falsification. p's truth and rational justifiability are relative to the standards used in evaluating p." (p. 6)
Siegel thinks he has refuted this kind of relativism; well, he's wrong about that, but he's right to assume that people have something like the above in mind when defending epistemological relativism.
> c) siihen, etta kohde itsessaan "das Ding an Sich" on
> hailuva, kutsun tata ontologiseksi relativismiksi.
> Ontologinen relativismi tai sen kieltaminen on kai viime kadessa uskon
> asia.
Well, if the opposite of this 'ontological relativism' is some version of metaphysical realism than indeed there are some plausible arguments against it.
Quite aside from the issue of metaphysical realism, one also needs to consider of course that historians and social scientists often shape the very nature they are studying.
> Epistemologinen relativismi on vaikeampi juttu. Tietomme koostuu
> kasitteista, eli ajatussisalloista, emmeka voi nousta kasitteiden
> ylapuolelle, ja sanoa, etta tuo kasite on tarkka ja tuo epatarkka, ja
> tuolle ei loydy vastinetta ollenkaan.
But that's not the problem of relativism, but rather of fallibilism which is again uncontroversial between the relativist and the realist as normally contrued.
> Kasitteet vain taistelevat
> keskenaan, ja vahvimmat elavat, ...
This is where mystification usually starts. No, concepts don't fight at all. It's people that fight and concepts are what they fight over and with. The point is not trivial, as the sociology of scientific knowledge has often shown.
> Ongelma on vain se, etta
> emme voi nousta kasitteiden ylapuolelle, ja sanoa lopulisesti, etta tuo
> ajatussisalto on lahempana todellisuutta kuin tuo toinen. Tassa suhteessa
> olen relativisti.
Again, this is fallibilism that even I. Niiniluoto accepts.
> Jos hyvaksymme epistemologisen relativismin periaatteen, tunnustamme
> vain, etta emme voi uskoa lopulliseen totuuteen, vaikka tiedon kenttamme
> laajentuisi ja tarkentuisikin. Tama ei kuitenkaan tee oppineiden valista
> vertailua mahdottomaksi. Voimme verrata eri teorioita niiden
> ristiriidattomuuden, kaudeuden ja selitysvoiman perusteella. Emme
> kuitenkaan voi panna teorioita paremmuusjarjestukseen sen perusteella,
> mika olisi lahinna totuutta, koska emme sita itsekaan tieda.
Things are more complicated than that. How theories are to be compared and assessed changes -- and in scientific controversies not only the theories or observations are contested but also the criteria for assessing them. (See, e.g. Collins, Changing Order, 1985).
Another complicating factor is that the notion of a final truth is itself highly problematic, and hard to spell out without running into paradox. (See. e.g. Grim, The Incomplete Universe, 1991).
> Jos uskomme, etta todellisuudella on muuttumaton perusta, ja voimme
> muodostaa siita tarkkoja kasitteita, voimme myos vertailla
> todellisuudesta esitettyja teorioita, olettaen etta vertailija tietaa kaiken.
Again, Grim shows that the notion of 'knowing all' leads to paradoxes.
Terv. Martin Kusch Science Studies Unit University of Edinburgh